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Abstract
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation
(Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance and
liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91 (3), 401–419.) under the
assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions.
Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or
continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history
of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in
equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected
by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust
to several extensions.
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1 Introduction
It is very inefficient from a social point of view if fundamentally healthy banks
are run, so policy should try to prevent its occurrence. Our paper contributes
to the literature on bank runs by proposing a theoretical model in which no
bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome in a game in which depositors
decide sequentially whether to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw it
and where it is commonly known that the bank is healthy. Our result requires
an extremely high level of available information about previous choices to
prevent this kind of bank runs and our theoretical finding is robust to relaxing
some of the informational conditions. We convey a clear message to policy
makers by highlighting the importance of making depositors’ decisions to
keep the money in the bank observable to the remaining depositors in the
queue which have not yet decided whether to withdraw their money or not.
Improving transparency regarding this issue, for example, by publishing the
amount of money kept in the bank at increased maturities would potentially
decrease the likelihood of bank runs on healthy banks.
While economic conditions and fundamentals are important factors that
determine to a large extent if a bank suffers a run (Gorton, 1988; Calomiris
and Mason, 2003), several studies point out convincingly that there are bank-
ing panics in periods with no economic distress (Ennis, 2003) and that even
banks with good fundamentals experience runs (De Graeve and Karas, 2014).
Our model hinges on the assumption that depositors react to other de-
positors’ observed decisions which is supported by empirical studies. Kelly
and O Grada (2000), Starr and Yilmaz (2007), and Iyer and Puri (2012) em-
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pirically analyze real-world bank runs and stress that depositors’ observed
actions affect their peers’ decisions. Notably, in all of these cases the banks
that suffered the run were fundamentally healthy, bad news about another
bank sparked the run. Experimental evidence also suggests that observabil-
ity plays an important role in the emergence of bank runs (see, for example,
Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012).
Moreover, Kiss et al. (2014) study a small-scale environment resembling the
Diamond-Dybvig setup in which bank runs are caused by coordination prob-
lems. They find that the more depositors can observe previous decisions,
the less likely it is that participants withdraw their funds from the bank.
More information about previous decisions seems to reduce the likelihood
of bank runs. In Garratt and Keister (2009) and Kiss et al. (2014) there
were no fundamental problems with the bank and it was common knowl-
edge, so there fundamental problems or negative information about the bank
extracted from the behavior of other depositors cannot be behind the runs.
Motivated by the relevance of observability of depositors’ decisions even
in case of fundamentally healthy banks, we modify the canonical Diamond-
Dybvig model (1983) assuming that depositors perfectly observe the actions
taken by those who precede them. We model a sequential-move game with
a finite number of depositors who contact the bank in an exogenously given
fixed order to communicate whether to leave the money deposited or to
withdraw it. We assume that there is aggregate certainty about liquidity
types, an assumption used by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and in recent
models, such as Ennis and Keister (2009a).1
Converting the original Diamond-Dybvig setup in which depositors decide
simultaneously into a sequential-move game yields interesting results. When
liquidity types and actions are perfectly observed, then no bank run occurs
and the Pareto efficient allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome. Our
1Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show for the case of stochastic withdrawals that the
results found without aggregate uncertainty about liquidity types need not hold.
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main contribution is to extend this result to the case when the sequence of
liquidity types is of imperfect information, that is, a depositor’s liquidity
type is her private information.
Under perfect information, our result is obtained by backward induction.
Waiting dominates withdrawal for the last patient depositor if enough depos-
itors waited before her. Anticipating this decision, the next to last patient
depositor’s decision is of the same nature, and by moving backwards, all
patient depositors wait.
Under imperfect information, the liquidity type vector is randomly se-
lected by nature and is unobserved by the depositors and the bank. Every
depositor, as it is her turn to decide, observes previous decisions and forms
beliefs about which type vector was selected, or in other words, whether be-
fore her withdrawals were due to impatient depositors only or patient ones as
well. Based on her observation, on her belief and on the strategy profile, a de-
positor determines whether it is optimal for her to withdraw or not. Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, as defined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), imposes
a strong rationality criterion on the strategy profile and belief system. This
enables us to obtain a unique prediction on depositors’ behavior which coin-
cides with the solution under perfect information. On the equilibrium path,
patient depositors wait and impatient ones withdraw. We show also that
this result is robust to moderate alterations in the model, the only exception
being that information about previous decisions should be higly detailed.
Although we cast our model in a banking environment, run-like phenom-
ena occur in other institutions and markets as well in which investors can
easily withdraw their funds or cease to roll over their investment. In such
settings our analysis applies analogously. For instance, Northern Rock, the
English bank was not first run by depositors, but by large creditors who pro-
vided short-term funding to the bank and did not renew it. Run-like episodes
also occurred in money-market, hedge and pension funds (Baba, McCauley
and Ramaswamy, 2009), the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) and
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even in bank lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).
1.1 Related literature
In the classic Diamond-Dybvig framework multiple equilibria exist, and the
Pareto efficient outcome of no bank run is no unique equilibrium. This sug-
gests that banks are intrinsically fragile and susceptible to self-fulfilling runs.
The subsequent literature attempts to identify elements that lead to this
kind of fragility. As Ennis and Keister (2010a) point out, it is important to
find the ingredients that help understand fragility in models that follow the
Diamond-Dybvig tradition as it has relevant consequences for public policy
regarding how desirable government-provided safety net elements, like de-
posit insurance, and other interventions are. Our paper contributes to this
understanding by studying the effect of observability that has been mostly
disregarded in theoretical papers although the empirical and experimental
evidence mentioned above indicates that it matters. The need to introduce
observability in models has been suggested by several researchers. For ex-
ample, Brunnermeier (2001, p.214) claims that “... withdrawals by deposit
holders occur sequentially in reality, [whereas] the literature typically models
bank runs as a simultaneous move game.”
There are two approaches in the literature to study bank runs: one is
game theoretic and the other based on mechanism design. Given certain
constraints, the mechanism design strand of the literature studies how to
optimally assign consumption to depositors depending on their announce-
ments.2 For example, Green and Lin (2003) add aggregate uncertainty about
liquidity needs to the Diamond-Dybvig framework and assume that depos-
itors know the order in which they have an opportunity to withdraw. The
bank updates its belief about the type distribution after each decision and
2Usually a direct revelation mechanism is studied: when contacting the bank, depositors
tell the bank their type. When a depositor announces to be impatient, the bank assigns
her an optimal consumption based on the available information.
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optimizes the contract accordingly. As a result, complex contracts arise that
are contingent on the exact sequence of announcements and payments to de-
positors may be fairly variable. Nevertheless, the Pareto efficient allocation
is shown to be the unique equilibrium outcome.3
In the game theoretic approach, first the Pareto efficient allocation is
found which a social planner would choose if she knew the type vector. Then,
the outcome of a game is studied assuming that types are imperfect informa-
tion. In the Diamond-Dybvig setup with aggregate certainty about liquidity
types the first best yields an optimal simple demand deposit contract that
determines how much the bank should pay to those who withdraw early and
together with the number of early withdrawals consumption in the second
period is determined. If the game is specified as a simultaneous-move game,
then a bank run and a no bank run equilibrium arise.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that even if the optimal simple de-
mand deposit contract is maintained, the Pareto efficient allocation becomes
the unique equilibrium outcome if the simultaneous-move game is comple-
mented by a suspension of convertibility clause. It stipulates that, after a cer-
tain number of withdrawals, payment to subsequent depositors is suspended,
guaranteeing the bank enough money to pay later. As a consequence, the
mere expectation of suspension is enough to rule out bank runs. Ennis and
Keister (2009a, 2010b) show that suspension of convertibility is successful
only if the bank can commit to use it as announced. The bank may fail to
do so, since once a bank run is underway, suspension may not be ex post
optimal: many depositors receive no money though they need liquidity. The
bank may then attend needy depositors which are exempted from suspension
as it happened during the deposit freezes in Argentina in 2001 or in the US
in March 1933 (see Ennis and Keister, 2009a). During these episodes, pay-
ments were rescheduled but made to those who demonstrated urgent need
for money, so suspension was not effective. If this lack of commitment is
3Ennis and Keister (2009b) show that this result fails to hold for correlated types.
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anticipated by the depositors, then suspension becomes ineffective ex ante
and bank runs may occur. Therefore, other arrangements have to be found
that may prevent bank runs even in a setup without aggregate uncertainty
about liquidity needs.4
Ennis and Keister (2010a) point out that the contract that implements the
optimal allocation in the Green-Lin model, mentioned above, is highly con-
tingent on the available information, and hence results in volatile payments
to depositors of the same liquidity type. However, in reality, we observe sta-
ble payments to depositors and the face value of deposits is respected most of
times. These features are more akin to the simple demand deposit contract
a´ la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We maintain this optimal simple demand
deposit contract and change the game by allowing the exact sequence of
previous actions to be observed, though not the liquidity type vector.5
While it is intuitive that withdrawals can be observed, the empirical stud-
ies cited above suggest that, at least to some extent, even waiting is observ-
able. Kelly and O Grada (2000) show that the most important factor deter-
mining whether an individual panicked or not in New York during a bank
run episode in the 19th century was his country of origin in Ireland. This
common origin presumably had an effect since immigrants from the same
country clustered in the same neighborhood and observed each other. Iyer
and Puri (2012) stress the importance of observing decisions of both sorts in
one’s social network when studying a bank run that occurred in India in 2001.
In Starr and Yilmaz (2007), small and medium-sized depositors of an Islamic
bank in Turkey seemed to observe only withdrawals of their peers during a
bank run incident in 2001, but the behavior of large depositors appears to
4Diamond and Dybvig (1983) study how deposit insurance may prevent bank runs,
though Wallace (1988) shows that the proposed approach is flawed since it is based on
taxation that is infeasible if impatient depositors need their funds urgently.
5In Chari and Jagannathan (1987) and in Gu (2011), depositors try to infer the bank’s
uncertain asset quality based on noisy private signals and other depositors’ observed deci-
sions. The focus is on the signal extraction problem rather than the coordination problem.
In section 3.4, we tackle the issue of information extraction.
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be affected by observing both actions.
Our paper shows that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome
if the history of previous actions is observed. The paper closest to ours
regarding the emphasis put on observability is Andolfatto et al. (2007) who
are the first to assume the observability of the history of announcements. In
the spirit of Green and Lin (2003), they use a mechanism design approach
in an environment characterized by aggregate uncertainty about liquidity
needs and show that any allocation that is implementable is also strongly
implementable. The role of observability is intricate. On the one hand,
knowing the complete history allows a depositor to condition her action on
it. This strengthens the incentive compatibility constraints, implying that
fewer allocations are implementable. On the other hand, a depositor prefers
to announce her type truthfully if she believes that those who follow her will
do so as well. In that sense, observing previous decisions does not affect
the optimal decision. Contrary to Andolfatto et al. (2007), we assume that
the bank pays the same amount of money to withdrawing depositors as long
as it has funds left. In our model, the bank may run out of funds, leaving
depositors who wish to withdraw unpaid. This cannot happen in Green and
Lin (2003) or Andolfatto et al. (2007). Depositors in our paper condition
their choice on the history of previous decisions and we consider all possible
histories after which a depositor is asked to decide. In a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, early depositors correctly anticipate to be on the equilibrium
path, take the optimal decision and lead the game down the path to the
unique equilibrium outcome with no bank run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and
defines the model. In section 3, we provide examples and the general results,
while section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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2 The model
There are three time periods denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, and a finite set of depos-
itors denoted by I = {1, ..., N}, where N > 2. The consumption of depositor
i ∈ I in period t = 1, 2 is denoted by ct,i ∈ R0+, and her liquidity type by θi.
This is a binomial random variable with support given by the set of liquidity
types Θ = {1, 2}. If θi = 1, depositor i is called impatient, that is, she only
cares about consumption at t = 1. If θi = 2, depositor i is called patient.
Given θi ∈ {1, 2}, each depositor i’s utility function is given by
ui(c1,i, c2,i, θi) = ui(c1,i + (θi − 1)c2,i).
It is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable and to satisfy the Inada conditions. The relative risk-aversion
coefficient, −ciu′′i (ci)/u′i(ci), is assumed to be strictly larger than 1, for all
ci ∈ R+, and all i ∈ I.
At t = 0, each depositor has one unit of a homogeneous good which she
deposits in the bank. The bank has access to a constant-return-to-scale pro-
ductive technology which pays a gross return of one unit for each endowment
liquidated at t = 1, and a fixed return of R > 1 for each endowment liqui-
dated at t = 2.6 It offers a simple demand deposit contract which pays c∗1 to
any depositor i who withdraws at t = 1, as long as the bank has funds left,
and the same pro rata share of funds available to all depositors who wait
until t = 2.
The number of patient depositors is assumed to be constant and given
by p ∈ {1, ..., N} and the remaining depositors are impatient. The number
of patient and impatient depositors is common knowledge. However, each
depositor’s type is only realized at t = 1.
Let ΘN = {1, 2}N , and θN = (θ1, ..., θN) denote the sequence of depos-
itors, also called (liquidity) type vector. The set of sequences of length N
6We follow the literature (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Green and Lin, 2003; Ennis and
Keister, 2009a) when assuming that there is no fundamental uncertainty about the return.
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with p patient depositors is given by
ΘN,p = {θN ∈ ΘN :
N∑
i=1






possible type vectors. At t = 1, one is selected randomly by
a process which selects each of them with equal probability. Under imperfect
information, the realized liquidity type vector is unobserved both by the
depositors and the bank, while it is observable under perfect information.
Next, the Pareto efficient allocation is derived. A social planner could
maximize the sum of depositors’ utilities (which are assumed to be identical,
except of the liquidity type) with respect to c1,i and c2,i subject to a resource
constraint and to the commonly known number of patient and impatient
depositors, p and N − p, respectively. The first best allocation solves
maxc1,i,c2,i(N − p)ui(c1,i) + pui(c2,i)
s. t. (N − p)c1,i + pRc2,i = N.
The solution to this problem is
u′(c∗1) = Ru
′(c∗2),
which, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), implies that R > c∗2 > c
∗
1 > 1.
In the first best allocation, all impatient depositors consume c∗1 at t = 1,
and all patient ones c∗2 at t = 2. Hence, patient depositors receive a higher
consumption than impatient ones.
2.1 Strategies and equilibrium concept
A sequential service constraint is assumed to hold, that is, at t = 1, the
depositors contact the bank sequentially in the order given by θN , and the
payment to any withdrawing depositor only depends on the history, but not
on the decisions of subsequent depositors, as will be specified below.
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Depositor i’s strategy si ∈ {1, 2} is to announce a type from Θ. When
type 1 or 2 is announced, she wishes to consume at t = 1 (i.e., withdraw) or at
t = 2 (i.e., wait), respectively. Anonymity is assumed, that is, the depositors’
indexes do not reveal any information. Each depositor i is assumed to observe
the entire history of previous type announcements si−1 = (s1, ..., si−1), where
si−1 ∈ Θi−1. Depositor i’s strategy is conditional on the history and her type.
It is defined as si : Θ
i−1 × Θ → Θ. Let S = {1, 2}N be the game’s strategy
space, and let s ∈ S be a strategy profile, that is, s = (s1, ..., sN). In order to
emphasize depositor i’s strategy, s is sometimes written as (si, s−i).
Given strategy profile s ∈ S, depositor i’s consumption is specified by
ci = (c1,i; c2,i), where c1,i : Θ
i → R0+, and c2,i : ΘN → R0+. The consumption





) ≤ N. Depositor i’s period-1
consumption is then defined as
c1,i =

c∗1, if si = 1 and N −
i−1∑
j=1
(2− sj)c∗1 ≥ c∗1,
y, if si = 1 and 0 < N −
i−1∑
j=1
(2− sj)c∗1 < c∗1,
0, otherwise,
where y = N−∑i−1j=1(2−sj)c∗1 : until the bank runs out of funds, any depositor
who announces to be impatient receives a positive consumption c∗1 or y.
Let η ∈ {0, ..., p} be the number of depositors who wait at t = 1, that
is, each of them announces to be of type 2.7 Given η = 1
2
∑N
i=1 si ≥ 0, all
players who wait at t = 1, obtain the same consumption at t = 2, namely,










Then, patient depositors enjoy a higher consumption than impatient ones.
7Note that η is restricted to be equal to p or smaller since an impatient depositor has
a dominant strategy to withdraw, and thus, not more than p depositors will wait.
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The consumption in both periods depends on the strategy profile and
determines each depositor’s utility. For any i ∈ I, and any s ∈ S, this is
denoted by ui(s). Thus, ui is a mapping from S to R0+. Let the tuple (I,S, u)
be the bank run game, where u = (u1, ..., uN).
Any depositor i observes history si−1, knows her type θi and the com-
monly known parameters p and N. However, under imperfect information,
she does not observe the realized type vector and both patient and impatient
depositors may choose to withdraw. Therefore, given the available informa-
tion, she forms beliefs about the type vector that was selected by nature. Let
µi ≡ µi(θN | si−1, θi) denote depositor i’s belief about the type vector. This
belief is conditional on the history and i’s type and is updated according to
Bayes’ rule whenever possible. The belief together with a strategy profile
defines a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given a bank run game. Then, strategy profile s ∈ S and
belief system µ = (µ1, ...µN) are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if,








N | si−1, θi)ui(˜si, s−i),
where µi(θ
N | si−1, θi) is consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
A strategy profile and belief system are a PBE if, and only if, the strat-
egy is sequentially rational given the belief for all players and the belief is
consistent with the strategy (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, and Myerson,
1997). Moreover, there are consistency requirements on the beliefs that arise
from the fact that p and N are commonly known and also since an impatient
depositor’s dominant strategy is to withdraw. These are discussed in more
depth in the section on imperfect information below.
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3 Results
The simple demand deposit contract defined above yields the Pareto efficient
allocation (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Our goal is to show that this
allocation is the unique PBE outcome of the bank run game.
Given p, N and c∗1, it is possible to determine how many patient depositors
have to wait in order for waiting to be an optimal strategy for each of them.
In Lemma 1, one part of this threshold is derived,8 namely, the one (denoted
as η¯) such that c2,i > c
∗
1, for every patient depositor i who waits at t = 1. If
some patient depositor declares to be impatient, then the bank spends funds
on her which it would otherwise have kept until t = 2. Recall that η is the
number of patient depositors that wait.
Lemma 1. Given p, N and c∗1, there is a unique η¯ such that 1 ≤ η¯ ≤ p, and
for every patient depositor i for whom si = 2, c2,i(η) ≤ c∗1, for all η ≤ η¯, and
c2,i(η) > c
∗
1, for all η > η¯.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 The type vector is perfect information
The benchmark case with perfect information is studied next. The depositors
commonly know the number of patient depositors p, and each depositor’s
type, or in other words, the type vector selected randomly by nature.
Any impatient depositor i has a dominant strategy to withdraw, and
thus, si(s
i−1, θi = 1) = 1 given any si−1. By eliminating uncertainty about
the type vector we can apply standard backward induction arguments to find
the equilibrium in Proposition 1.9
8The other part is a technical detail which is derived below in Proposition 1’s proof.
9Given that types are observable, the bank could directly impose the first best allocation
by denying to pay to patient depositors.
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Proposition 1. Given a bank run game. Suppose that the type vector is
perfect information. Then, the Pareto efficient allocation is the unique PBE
outcome and depositors tell the truth.
Proposition 1’s proof can be found in Appendix B. Since the type vector is
of perfect information, the concepts of subgame perfect equilibrium and PBE
coincide. Intuitively, the last patient depositor’s optimal decision is to wait if
enough preceding patient depositors waited so that her consumption in period
2 is higher than that received upon immediate withdrawal. Anticipating this
decision, the next to last patient depositor’s optimal decision is of the same
nature, and by moving backward all patient depositors wait.
3.2 The type vector is imperfect information
When the type vector is not observable, depositors cannot apply the previous
reasoning. Nevertheless and as before, they commonly know p and N, and
that nature selects each type vector with equal probability. Moreover, each
depositor knows her own type and observes the history. This is referred to
as available information. Given the available information, a depositor forms
beliefs about the type vector selected by nature and, by sequential ratio-
nality, anticipates how subsequent depositors behave. In this environment of
imperfect information, sequential rationality plays a similar role as backward
induction in games of perfect information (see Myerson, 1997). Before prov-
ing the general result, the difficulties that arise are illustrated in an example.
3.2.1 Example
Suppose that there are four depositors: one is impatient and the other three
are patient. Before the game begins, nature selects each of the four possible
type vectors with equal probability. Once the type vector is selected, each
depositor observes her type but not any other’s. Then, they take decisions
in a sequential order. Moreover, we make the following assumption.
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Assumption 1. All three patient depositors have to keep the money in the
bank in order to make waiting worthwhile for all of them.
We depict the corresponding extensive form of the game in Figure 1, where
p stands for patient, i for impatient, keep for wait, and wi for withdraw,
and where the outcome of each branch of the game is depicted, that is,
bank run and no bank run, respectively. A bank run occurs if at least one
patient depositor withdraws. Several information sets are not singletons: for
instance, a patient depositor 2 who observes a withdrawal could be in a type
vector that starts with a patient depositor who decided to withdraw or in
the type vector that begins with the impatient depositor. Finally, in order
to simplify the figure, we suppose that each impatient depositor withdraws
since this is a dominant strategy for her, as is shown below.
Suppose that each depositor deposits 1 unit in the bank at t = 0 and let
ui = c1 + (θi − 1)c2 for all i, c∗1 = 1.5 and R = 1.9. Then, c2 is obtained
by multiplying the funds left at t = 2 by 1.9 and dividing them by the
number of depositors that waited at t = 1. It is easy to calculate that after
two withdrawals 3 of the 4 units deposited in the bank are gone and any
remaining depositor is strictly better off to withdraw the remaining funds of
1 at t = 1 rather than to wait: if two depositors wait, then at t = 2, the total
funds left are 1.9 which yields 1.9
2
for each of them and this is less than 1. So
any subsequent depositor is better off to withdraw the remaining funds, and
therefore, this example fulfils Assumption 1.
Now we identify all possible strategy profiles that can arise given the set of
depositors, their types and strategies. This provides a complete description
of all possible equilibrium candidate strategy profiles:
• Pooling equilibrium candidate: all depositors choose the same action.
• Separating equilibrium candidate: all depositors of one type choose the
same action, and that of the other type the other action.
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Figure 1: Extensive form game of example
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• Any other equilibrium candidate: the impatient depositor waits or
withdraws, at least one patient depositor waits and at least one pa-
tient depositor withdraws.
Obviously, any impatient depositor i is never strictly better off to with-
draw since θi = 1 for her. So any candidate strategy profile which contains
such a case is never a PBE. In all remaining cases, the impatient depositor
withdraws, while the patient depositors withdraw in a pooling equilibrium,
wait in a separating equilibrium, and in any other case at least one of them
waits and at least one of them withdraws.
Deriving the PBE Now we will go through the three candidate strategy
profiles that are left. Consider first the separating PBE candidate: inde-
pendently of the realized type vector, on the equilibrium path, each patient
depositor waits, while the single impatient depositor withdraws.
Impatient depositor: Since an impatient depositor has a dominant strategy
to withdraw, her strategy is optimal after any history and given any belief.10
She has no profitable deviation from withdrawing and, given that she is
impatient, her updated prior belief assigns probability 1 to the true type
vector selected by nature since the other three depositors are patient.
Patient depositors: Consider now a patient depositor’s complete strategy and
belief system for the four possible positions she can have.
Depositor 4: On the equilibrium path, there are two patient depositors before
her who waited and an impatient one who withdrew. Hence, she identifies
the type vector and, by Bayesian belief updating, µ4 assigns probability 1 to
the true type vector selected by nature.
To wait yields her u4 =
1
3
(4−1.5)1.9 = 1.58, while she gets u4 = 1.5 if she
withdraws, and she is strictly better off to wait. Her strategy is sequentially
rational given her belief and her belief is consistent with the strategy.
10Though on an off-equilibrium path on which the bank ran out of funds she is indifferent
to wait or not since her utility is 0 anyway, and thus, her strategy is not strictly dominant.
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Suppose next that she observes an off-equilibrium path history. After
history (2, 1, 1) or (1, 2, 1), her belief updating is unconstrained since both
histories have an ex ante 0-probability. After history (1, 1, 2) or (1, 1, 1),
depositor 4 updates µ4 according to Bayes’ rule, though depositor 3 updated
µ3 after an unexpected history in an unconstrained way.
If there were three withdrawals, then all 4 units deposited in the bank are
gone and depositor 4 receives 0 in any case. Hence, she can neither deviate
profitably by waiting nor by withdrawing. If two depositors withdrew and
one waited, then there is 1 unit left in the bank. In case depositor 4 waits
she gets, as derived above, 1.9
2
< 1, and she is strictly better off to withdraw
the remaining funds of 1 at t = 1. Her decision is sequentially rational given
the observed history and any consistent belief, and any belief is consistent
with the strategy.
Suppose next that depositor 4 observes history (2, 2, 2), that is, all three
preceding depositors waited. On this off-equilibrium path, depositor 4’s ex-
pected utility is higher if she waits since this yields her a payoff of 1.9 instead
of 1.5 if she withdraws. Her decision is independent of her belief, that is, for
any consistent belief she may have, her strategy is sequentially rational.
Depositor 3: There are four possible histories a patient depositor 3 can ob-
serve. After histories (2, 2), (2, 1) and (1, 2), she believes to be on the
equilibrium path and Bayesian belief updating assigns probability 1 to type
vectors (2, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2, 2) and (1, 2, 2, 2), respectively. In the first case,
depositor 3 is the third depositor that waits. In the last two cases, she is the
second that waits, but believes with probability 1 that depositor 4 is patient
and by sequential rationality anticipates that depositor 4 will wait.
If she and two more depositors wait, then her utility is u3 = 1.58, while
it is 1.5 if she withdraws. Since her belief assigns probability 1 to a type
vector in which the three patient depositors wait, she is strictly better off to
wait. Her strategy is sequentially rational given her belief, and her belief is
consistent given the strategy.
18
Finally, suppose that she observes history (1, 1), that is, the only possible
off-equilibrium path history a patient depositor 3 can identify as such. Since
this history has an ex ante 0-probability, belief updating is unconstrained. In
any case, if she withdraws, then she receives a utility of 1, while she receives
a utility of 0 if she waits, since depositor 4, after observing two withdrawals,
as just derived, would then withdraw the remaining funds of 1. Her strategy
is optimal given the observed history and there are several consistent beliefs.
Depositor 2: She either observes that depositor 1 waits or withdraws. In
both cases, her observation is consistent with the equilibrium path. After




vectors (2, 2, 1, 2) and (2, 2, 2, 1), and after observing a withdrawal, µ2
assigns probability 1 to type vector (1, 2, 2, 2). Both beliefs are updated
by Bayes’ rule and are consistent with her observing the strategy profile in
which all patient depositors wait.
If she observes a waiting and waits herself, by sequential rationality, she
anticipates that the last patient depositor behind her waits, and if she ob-
serves a withdrawal, then she believes that the two remaining depositors after
her in the queue are patient and will wait, as derived above. Her expected
utility by waiting is u2 = 1.58, and it is 1.5 if she withdraws. To wait yields
her a higher expected utility. Depositor 2’s belief µ2 is consistent with the
strategy profile which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Depositor 1: She knows that she is patient and her belief µ1 assigns an equal
probability of 1
3
to type vectors (2, 2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 1, 2) and (2, 1, 2, 2), respec-
tively. By sequential rationality, she anticipates that, on the equilibrium
path, the other two patient depositors wait, since their reasoning is as de-
rived above. Her expected utility by waiting is u1 = 1.58, while it is 1.5 if she
withdraws. To wait yields her a higher utility. Belief µ1 is consistent with
the strategy profile which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Given this strategy, any depositor’s decision on the equilibrium path is
fully revealing for the subsequent depositors and no bank run is a PBE.
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On the equilibrium path, any other belief system is not consistent with
the strategy profile and the available information since it assigns a positive
probability to a depositor who withdraws to be patient or to a depositor who
waits to be impatient or both. However, on some off-equilibrium path, while
the depositors’ strategies are optimal given the observed history, their belief
updating is unconstrained and there are several possible consistent beliefs.
Hence, there are multiple PBE strategy profiles which differ by depositors’
beliefs and strategies off the equilibrium path. Yet, given any consistent belief
system, the strategy profile is a PBE and yields no bank run as outcome.
Uniqueness of PBE outcome We show next that the pooling equilib-
rium candidate in which all three patient depositors withdraw is no PBE
since some patient depositor has a profitable deviation. Thereafter, we do
the same for any remaining strategy profiles in which at least one patient
depositor waits and at least one withdraws. In this way, we consider all
possible strategy profiles, and after showing that a bank run is never a PBE
outcome, it follows that no bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
Pooling PBE candidate: all depositors withdraw Since the impa-
tient depositor’s dominant strategy is to withdraw, we focus on the decision
of patient depositors. A patient depositor 4 observes three withdrawals on
the proposed equilibrium path. Since this implies that the bank is bankrupt
she is indifferent to wait or withdraw and has no profitable deviation from
withdrawing. Her utility is 0 in any case and she withdraws.
In order to analyze her off-equilibrium behavior, we focus on a specific
history for which we will show that some depositor has a profitable deviation.
Suppose that on an off-equilibrium path, a patient depositor 4 observes
that two depositors waited before her. Then, identically as above, waiting
yields her u4 = 1.58 and withdrawing u4 = 1.5, and she is strictly better
off to wait. This is sequentially rational for her given the observed history.
While the depositor who observes the first waiting updates her belief in an
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unconstrained way since she finds herself on an off-equilibrium path, depos-
itor 4 updates her belief based on this in a Bayesian way. Thus, µ4 could
assign probability 1 to the type vector in which the depositor who withdrew
is impatient. This belief is consistent with this off-equilibrium path strategy
which in turn is sequentially rational given her belief.
On the equilibrium path, a patient depositor 3 observes two withdrawals
and is strictly better off to withdraw the remaining funds of 1 rather than to
wait. Suppose that on an off-equilibrium path she observes that two deposi-
tors waited before her. Then, by waiting she receives a strictly higher utility
of 1.58 than by withdrawing which only yields 1.5, and it is sequentially ra-
tional for her to wait given the observed history. Similarly as before, updated
belief µ3 could assign probability 1 to the type vector in which the last de-
positor is impatient. This belief is consistent with the available information
and the strategy which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Suppose now that a patient depositor 3 observes that depositor 1 waited
and depositor 2 withdrew. Then, depositor 3 is strictly better off to wait
rather than to withdraw since this yields her a higher expected utility. She
anticipates, by sequential rationality, that depositor 4 will wait and that
a patient depositor 2 would have waited upon observing that depositor 1
waited, as will be derived next. Her belief µ3 could assign probability 1 to
the type vector in which depositor 2 is impatient. Her belief is consistent
with the strategy which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Consider now a patient depositor 2. On the equilibrium path, she observes
one withdrawal and cannot update her belief from the prior. Thus, she is
strictly better off to withdraw rather than to wait. Suppose that on an off-
equilibrium path she observes that depositor 1 waits. Since this history has
an ex ante 0-probability her belief updating is unconstrained. However, it is
consistent for a patient depositor 2 to believe that it is equally likely for the
impatient depositor to be in the third or fourth position, respectively, and
for the third patient depositor to be in the other. By sequential rationality
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and as just derived, she anticipates that, if she waits, then the last patient
depositor in the queue will wait as well. This yields her a higher expected
utility and she waits. Her belief is consistent with the strategy which in turn
is sequentially rational given her belief.
On the equilibrium path, a patient depositor 1 should withdraw. However,
she can increase her expected utility by deviating, that is, by waiting. By
sequential rationality, she anticipates that then the second patient depositor
waits, as just derived, independently of whether she is in position 2 or 3.
Then, the last patient depositor in the queue, as just derived, is strictly
better off to wait as well upon observing two waitings. Hence, there is no
bank run. Depositor 1 cannot update her prior: yet her belief is consistent
given the strategy profile which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Given this strategy profile and any type vector in which depositor 1 is
patient, there is no bank run since depositor 1 has a profitable deviation to
lead the game onto an off-equilibrium path on which all patient depositors
wait. Therefore, for all depositors to withdraw is no PBE since there is a
type vector such that some depositor has a profitable deviation.
Any other PBE candidate Similarly, any other strategy profile in
which one or two patient depositors are asked to withdraw is no PBE. Con-
sider first that two patient depositors are asked to wait and one to withdraw.
Suppose that the type vector is such that depositors 1 and 2 are patient and
both wait. Then, the last patient depositor in the queue is asked to withdraw.
However, analogously as before, she deviates profitably by waiting.
Suppose next that two patient depositors are asked to withdraw and one
to wait. If depositor 1 is patient and waits then, analogously as above, it is
sequentially rational for the remaining two patient depositors to wait as well.
The first one has a profitable deviation to wait rather than to withdraw as
prescribed, and the other is then strictly better off to wait once she observed
two waitings since this yields her a higher utility than to withdraw.
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Therefore, any PBE candidate strategy profile that yields a bank run as
outcome is no PBE since we have shown that for each of them there is a type
vector such that some patient depositor has a profitable deviation. Hence,
in this example, no bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
3.3 The general case
The arguments in the previous subsection are generalized in order to find the
set of PBE for any bank run game and the unique PBE outcome is no bank
run which is the Pareto efficient allocation.
Proposition 2. Given a bank run game. Suppose that the type vector is
imperfect information. Then, the Pareto efficient allocation is the unique
PBE outcome.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix C. Intuitively, in any
PBE, given the available information, it is consistent for a patient depositor
to believe to be on the equilibrium path as long as there are N − p or less
withdrawals, that is, unless she observes a history which is incompatible with
being on the equilibrium path. Given this belief, it obviously yields her a
higher expected utility to wait. She waits and anticipates, by sequential
rationality, that all other patient depositors behind her will wait as well. For
each of them, an analogous reasoning applies and it is optimal to wait. This
in turn generates a history which induces all other patient depositors to wait,
while all impatient ones withdraw. No bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
However, as in the example above, there are several PBE strategy profiles
and belief systems which all are identical on the equilibrium path, though
they differ on off-equilibrium paths.
Analogously to the example, given any other strategy profile, there is a
type vector for which some patient depositor has a profitable deviation and
by leading the game down an off-equilibrium path, all patient depositors are
better off to wait. By doing this, each of them receives a higher payoff.
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4 Robustness considerations and discussion
In this section first we deal with the robustness of our assumptions and then
we discuss some interesting directions for future research.
4.1 Robustness of assumptions
An interpretation of our main result is the following. Depositors deciding
sequentially and observing all previous decisions is a sufficient condition to
prevent bank runs. It is natural to ask what are the necessary conditions,
that is, does the result hold if we relax either i) assumptions about the
information, or ii) other assumptions related to uncertainty.
4.1.1 Exogenous sequence of decisions
We assume that the sequence of moves is exogenously determined after a
random draw which selects each sequence with equal probability. This as-
sumption follows the literature (Green and Lin, 2003; Andolfatto et al., 2007;
Ennis and Keister, 2009b).11 In this spirit, our paper is no attempt to for-
mally making this sequence endogenous.
However, suppose that before the bank run game is played, the deposi-
tors play a game to determine endogenously the position they occupy in the
queue. As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, no bank run is the unique equilib-
rium outcome given any sequence of depositors. To determine the sequence
endogenously would not change this result: each depositor is indifferent of
which position to occupy since the unique outcome is no bank run. The game
is still solved by backward induction or sequential rationality, respectively,
11Ennis and Keister (2010a), in a literature survey, note that “[i]n the Diamond-Dybvig
tradition, the order in which agents get an opportunity to withdraw is assumed to be
exogenously given (generally determined by a random draw). In other words, agents in
the model are not allowed to take explicit actions to change their order of arrival. This
assumption is, of course, extreme and, unfortunately, not much is known so far about the
case where it is not made.”
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and therefore, the bank run game played after determining the sequence is
resolved first and yields no bank run as unique outcome. Hence, depositors
are indifferent regarding the position. In any case, assuming that indifferent
depositors determine the order of moves endogenously resembles very much
the assumption of a random draw of the sequence before the game begins.12
Finally, it should be noted that sequentiality (but not the order) seems
to be a necessary condition since the original Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model
is a simultaneous move game and has both a bank run and a no bank run
equilibrium.
4.1.2 Extent of observability
The novel assumption of our model is that all previous choices are observed
as they are made.13 This implies that each depositor knows her position in
the queue. What would happen if this assumption does not hold? It may be
violated in several ways.
First, suppose that only withdrawals are observed (and the position is
not known, but depositors draw conclusions about it from the previously
observed number of withdrawals). Consider the four-depositor example of
section 3.2.1 and the following run candidate strategy for patient depositors:
withdraw after 0, 1 and 2 withdrawals.14 It is easy to see that there is no
profitable unilateral deviation from the strategy. Even if a patient depositor
waits instead of withdrawing, then this is not observed, so if the other patient
depositors follow the proposed strategy then the deviation does not pay off.
Hence, bank run is an equilibrium outcome.
Second, it is possible that some depositors do not observe each other. As-
12This conclusion would not hold any longer if the bank had fundamental problems since
then the informed depositors have an incentive to be at the beginning of the sequence.
13While Andolfatto et al. (2007) assume observability of the history as well, their
approach is based on mechanism design, while ours is game theoretic.
14After 3 withdrawals the bank ran out of funds, so a depositor is indifferent to wait
or withdraw. Note also that in this setup a strategy can only depend on the number of
observed withdrawals.
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sume, for instance, that in our four-depositor example, depositor 2 does not
observe depositor 1’s decision and this is commonly known. All other depos-
itors observe all previous decisions. We propose the following run candidate
strategy for patient depositors: withdraw in position 1 and 2, withdraw in
position 3 and 4, unless you observe at least two waitings and wait otherwise.
Note that a patient depositor in position 2 has no profitable unilateral devia-
tion given the withdrawal of depositor 1 and the strategies of the subsequent
depositors and the same is true for a patient depositor 1. In Proposition 2,
this strategy profile is no PBE since depositor 1 has a profitable deviation to
wait, depositor 2 observes this and is also strictly better off to wait bringing
the game on a path that results in no bank run. The lack of observability
between depositors 1 and 2 would make bank run an equilibrium outcome.
The previous reasoning suggests that if perfect observability is violated,
then bank run re-emerges as an equilibrium outcome. Undoubtedly, more
research is needed to establish necessary conditions to prevent bank runs,
though the above arguments indicate that the available information about
previous choices should be very exhaustive.
4.2 Discussion
We discuss briefly two ways that seem promising to extend the model and
how they affect or modify our results.
4.2.1 Information Extraction Problem
In our analysis, one of the main assumptions is that the bank has no funda-
mental problem. Hence, a bank run could only be triggered by depositors’
miscoordination. In reality, frequently, there is an additional information
extraction problem, that is, the depositors are not sure whether the bank
has fundamental problems or not, and they make inferences based on the
observed decisions. In this case, our results need to be qualified. However,
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to study an information extraction problem under the assumption that the
bank is not fundamentally healthy is left for future research.
4.2.2 Uncertainty
Uncertainty could be introduced in various ways. Suppose first that each de-
positor is crazy or irrational with a very small probability, that is, a patient
depositor withdraws while an impatient one waits. As long as the corre-
sponding probabilities are small, our result does not change. Suppose that
each depositor is irrational with a minor probability of ε > 0 and is rational
with a complementary probability of (1− ε). Irrationality is assumed to be
independently and identically distributed among depositors. Then, our re-
sults of Propositions 1 and 2 carry over to the case with irrationality. We
call this the bank run game with irrational depositors.
Corollary 1. Given a bank run game with irrational depositors. Then, there
is ε¯ > 0 close enough to 0, such that for all 0 < ε < ε¯, the unique PBE
outcome is almost surely the one obtained in Propositions 1 and 2.
The proof of this corollary is straightforward and we sketch it briefly:
Consider first the equilibrium candidate. As ε converges to 0, there is a
value of ε¯ > 0 such that each patient depositor almost surely is rational.
Therefore, she almost surely waits. This is true for all patient depositors,
and hence, almost surely there is no bank run. Similarly, this is true for any
other candidate strategy profile that was shown to be no PBE above.
A second source of potential uncertainty concerns the share of impatient
depositors. When there is some but little uncertainty about the fraction of
impatient depositors, then the same results as before hold as long as not all
patient depositors need to wait in order for waiting to be the optimal decision
for all other patient depositors. When to the contrary uncertainty about the
share of impatient depositors is sufficiently large, then our results need not
hold any longer. However, the corresponding analysis is beyond the scope of
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this paper.15
Finally, consider that the bank’s return is risky. In case the expected
return R of the bank is less than 1, then obviously, each depositor’s payoff
is strictly larger when she successfully withdraws her money at t = 1. In
order to analyze a meaningful problem, we therefore assume that the bank
invests the money in a risky asset with expected return R > 1 which is
realized at the beginning of period 2 just before the bank returns money to
all depositors that waited at t = 1. If the expected return is high enough,
so that it compensates even risk-averse depositors for the implied enhanced
risks, then our results do not change.
It would be realistic and interesting to study how the three sources of
uncertainty affect our results when their impact is sufficiently large. However,
this is beyond the scope of our paper, and therefore, left for future research.
5 Conclusion
Descriptions of bank runs suggest that depositors’ behavior depends cru-
cially on other depositors’ observed behavior. Existing theoretical models in
the Diamond-Dybvig tradition, without aggregate uncertainty about liquid-
ity needs, do not incorporate this idea, sequentiality is missing from them.
We attempt to fill this gap and assume that depositors observe all previous
decisions. We show that bank runs do not occur in equilibrium, even though
the type of preceding depositors is not observed. This result contrasts starkly
with the findings of previous models, and suggests that the insensitivity of
the Diamond-Dybvig contract to aggregate liquidity needs need not lead to
multiple equilibria, one of them being a bank run. If all previous decisions
are observed, in our model, bank runs are no equilibrium outcome.
15If the bank maximizes depositors’ expected utility given this kind of uncertainty, then
the model changes substantially and resembles Green and Lin (2003). Note that—as
already pointed out by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)—if the share of impatient depositors
is not fixed, then the simple demand deposit contract cannot achieve optimal risk sharing.
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Two elements of the model contribute to the absence of bank runs. First,
aggregate certainty enables coordination as it signals all patient depositors
that it is in their interest to wait, that is, it is commonly known that a
bank run never occurs if all of them wait. Moreover, this assumption is
quite realistic most of times. Second, the sequentiality of moves together
with the perfect observability of previous decisions ensure that this is the
unique PBE outcome. This equilibrium concept imposes strong rationality
requirements on the depositors in terms of beliefs and sequential rationality.
Our result is robust to endogenizing the sequence of decisions, and to some
uncertainty about the irrationality of depositors, the share of the different
liquidity types and the riskiness of the technology that the bank invests in.
However, it seems that the available information about the previous decisions
should be highly detailed. Arguably, in reality depositors do not have this
amount of information. Nevertheless, we think that our paper is useful for
policy makers by stressing the importance of transparency. By making the
decision to wait observable, for example, by publishing maturity data and
convincing depositors to extend the maturity of their deposits, bank runs on
fundamentally healthy banks due to coordination failure among depositors
could be prevented.
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Appendix A
Appendix A contains the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. In order to derive the threshold value η¯, a condition is found such
that c∗1 is strictly smaller than period-2 consumption, that is,
c∗1 <




where the right-hand-side is period-2 consumption if η depositors wait at





Denote by [x] the integer part of any x ∈ R. Since η is a natural number,







The right-hand side of (3) defines the threshold value η¯. This value is unique
since the bank pays to every depositor who withdraws c∗1, and therefore,
loses funds monotonically. If there are too many withdrawals by patient
depositors, then the bank only pays c2,i < c
∗
1 to every depositor i who waits
until t = 2. If the number of patient depositors that wait η is not larger than
η¯, as derived in (3), then period-2 consumption is strictly below c∗1.
Appendix B
Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We show that under perfect information, in the unique PBE which in
this case is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium each depositor announces
her type truthfully.
First, conditions are derived under which period-1 consumption is strictly
larger than period-2 consumption and a patient depositor is better off to
withdraw at t = 1, that is, she declares to be impatient. Then, it is shown
that this never occurs in equilibrium, the depositors’ equilibrium strategies
are derived and shown to be a PBE, and finally, uniqueness is established.
As shown in Lemma 1, if η¯ or less patient depositors wait, then c2,i < c
∗
1
and a patient depositor is better off to withdraw as long as the bank pays
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her c∗1. However, if there are further withdrawals, then at some point the
bank has 0 < y < c∗1 of funds left which she pays to the last depositor who
withdraws. Once there are y of funds left, if period-2 consumption is larger
than or equal to y, then any patient depositor is better off to wait only if
there is no more impatient depositor left in the queue who withdraws y. If, on
the other hand, period-2 consumption is smaller than y, then even a patient
depositor is better off to withdraw y at t = 1, rather than to wait and get
less at t = 2. In this case, the depositor whose turn it is, once the bank has
y of funds left, withdraws y independently of her type.
Now the depositors’ complete strategy is derived: an impatient depositor
always withdraws; a patient one withdraws if, and only if, her period-1 con-
sumption is strictly larger than period-2 consumption. Otherwise, she waits.
This is a subgame perfect equilibrium and a PBE of the bank run game if no
depositor’s deviation from this strategy profile is profitable. Any impatient
depositor i’s deviation to wait at t = 1, yields her the same (if no funds are
left in the bank) or a lower utility of ui = 0, since for her θi = 1, and thus,
this deviation is not profitable. Consider now any patient depositor’s uni-
lateral deviation. If she withdraws instead of waiting, then her consumption
is c∗1 < c
∗
2, and this deviation is not profitable for her given that all other
patient depositors wait under the proposed strategy profile. Consider next a
history after which period-2 consumption is below period-1 consumption for
a patient depositor since the conditions derived in the previous paragraph
apply. Then, a patient depositor’s strategy prescribes her to withdraw at
t = 1. She cannot deviate profitably by waiting which would yield her less.
Remember that the type vector is publicly observed. The subgame perfect
equilibrium is found by backward induction. Any impatient depositor has a
dominant strategy to withdraw at t = 1. The last patient depositor waits if
her consumption is c2,i > c
∗
1 or c2,i > y. The next to last patient depositor
waits if the identical condition holds anticipating (by backward induction)
that then also the last patient depositor is strictly better off to wait. By
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induction, this is true for all patient depositors. Finally, by induction, also
the first patient depositor waits, that is, all of them wait and each receives
c∗2 > c
∗
1. Applying backward induction, each depositor’s decision is unique
on the equilibrium path since none of them is ever indifferent. However, on
any off-equilibrium path on which the bank ran out of funds, any depositor
is indifferent to wait or withdraw since her utility is 0 independently of her
strategy and type. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium outcome, while
there are several subgame perfect equilibria and PBE which differ by the
depositors’ behavior on irrelevant off-equilibrium paths.
Appendix C
Appendix C contains the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We prove Proposition 2 in various steps. Note that the complete
description of all possible classes of equilibrium strategy profile candidates
is identical to that in the example in section 3.2.1. We show first that any
candidate in which some impatient depositor is prescribed to wait on the
equilibrium path is no PBE. For the remaining classes, we then show whether
the corresponding strategy profiles are PBE or not, and finally, it follows as a
corollary that the unique equilibrium outcome is no bank run since the only
class of strategy profiles that are PBE is the one that yields no bank run as
outcome. All others are no PBE.
Suppose that some impatient depositor is prescribed to wait on the equi-
librium path. Then, there is a type vector in which some depositor has a
profitable deviation. Suppose that depositor 1 is impatient and is asked to
wait. Then, she gets a utility of 0 if she waits and c∗1 if she withdraws.
Thus, she is strictly better off to withdraw and this deviation is profitable.
Therefore, any equilibrium candidate strategy profile in which some impa-
tient depositor is asked to wait is no PBE since there is a type vector for
which some depositor has a profitable deviation.
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Hence, a separating equilibrium candidate is left in which patient depos-
itors wait and impatient ones withdraw on the equilibrium path; a pooling
equilibrium candidate in which all depositors withdraw on the equilibrium
path; and any other equilibrium candidate in which, on the equilibrium path,
all impatient depositors and at least one patient depositor withdraw and at
least one patient depositor is asked to wait.
No PBE
We show next that any pooling equilibrium candidate and any other equilib-
rium candidate are no PBE.
Pooling equilibrium candidate: On the equilibrium path, any depositor is
asked to withdraw, and thus, her type is not revealed. In order to show that
this strategy profile is no PBE, we propose a type vector and a history such
that some depositor has a profitable deviation.
Before proposing a type vector, we derive the patient depositors’ opti-
mal off-equilibrium path strategy depending on their position in the queue.
Consider first a patient depositor towards the end of the queue who observes
p − 1 waitings, one of them being depositor 1. She concludes that she is
off-equilibrium, that the p− 1 depositors that waited before her are patient
and that she is the last patient depositor in the queue since she anticipates
that all other patient depositors before her upon observing this history ap-
ply an analogous reasoning, as will become clear shortly. She believes that
all remaining depositors in the queue are impatient and is strictly better off
to wait given her type and the observed history (independently of her be-
lief). Waiting yields her c∗2, while she gets c
∗
1 if she withdraws. She waits as
prescribed or has a profitable deviation to wait if she is asked to withdraw.
An analogous argument applies to any patient depositor i who observes
that depositor 1 waited and in total η¯ or more waitings, where η¯ is as derived
in Lemma 1. She has a strictly dominant strategy to wait since c2,i > c
∗
1,i
and concludes that those depositors before her that waited are patient and
all others impatient. Given that depositor 1 deviated and waited, i concludes
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that depositor 1 is patient and that any subsequent patient depositor upon
observing this history applies an identical reasoning and waits as well, an-
ticipating that all other patient depositors reason identically. Her updated
belief assigns an equal probability to each type vector in which the remaining
patient and impatient depositors occupy the remaining positions behind her
in the queue. By sequential rationality she anticipates that all remaining
patient depositors will wait upon observing this history. Her strategy is se-
quentially rational given the observed history and given her belief, and her
belief is consistent with her strategy.
Consider now a patient depositor who observed that depositor 1 and in
total η¯ − 1 depositors waited. She believes that upon observing depositor
1 waiting, any subsequent patient depositor waited and any impatient one
withdrew and that the remaining patient and impatient depositors are behind
her in the queue. If she waits, then the next patient depositor in the queue
has a strictly dominant strategy to wait. Hence, it is sequentially rational
for her to wait since this yields her a higher expected payoff given her belief
that any depositor before her who withdrew must be impatient, and thus,
that there are enough patient depositors left behind her in the queue for
period-2 consumption to be strictly larger than period-1 consumption since,
by sequential rationality, she anticipates that all of them apply an analogous
reasoning and will wait upon observing this history. On this off-equilibrium
path, she either deviates profitably by waiting or is prescribed to wait.
Consider now a patient depositor towards the beginning of the queue.
Suppose that she observes that depositor 1 waited instead of withdrawing
as prescribed. Then, she knows that this depositor deviated bringing the
game onto an off-equilibrium path, and concludes that all other depositors
before her that waited are patient since an impatient one would never wait
and since all patient ones apply an identical reasoning. Her belief assigns
an equal probability for all remaining patient depositors to occupy the re-
maining positions behind her in the queue. By sequential rationality and as
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just derived, she anticipates that all of them will wait upon observing this
history since this yields them a strictly larger payoff. Then, her expected
payoff from waiting is strictly larger than her payoff from withdrawing. She
deviates profitably if she is asked to withdraw and otherwise complies with
her strategy and waits.
Going backwards, by induction, this argument applies analogously to
all patient depositors in the queue. Given a type vector in which the first
depositor is patient, by sequential rationality, she anticipates that if she waits,
then she leads the game onto an off-equilibrium path on which it is then
sequentially rational for all remaining patient depositors in the queue to wait
as well. This yields no bank run as outcome. She has a profitable deviation to
wait rather than to withdraw as prescribed. In this case, depositor 2’s belief
updating is unconstrained since this history has a 0-probability to occur.
However, it is consistent for her to believe that depositor 1 is patient. Based
on this, all other depositors then update their beliefs in a Bayesian way.
Thus, we have shown that there are type vectors in which a patient de-
positor who is first in the line has a profitable deviation to wait rather than
to withdraw. Therefore, the pooling strategy profile is no PBE.
Any other equilibrium candidate: In this case, at least one and at most p− 1
patient depositors and all impatient depositors are asked to withdraw.
Suppose first that η¯ or more patient depositors are asked to wait such
that c2,i > c
∗
1 for any patient depositor i who waits. Then, obviously, any
patient depositor i who is asked to withdraw has a profitable deviation to
wait as well since c2,i > c
∗
1; waiting is a strictly dominant strategy for her.
Suppose next that the number of patient depositors who are asked to
wait is below η¯ such that c2,i < c
∗
1 for any patient depositor i who waits. As
before, the type of a depositor who withdraws is not revealed, though it is
consistent for a depositor to believe that those who wait are patient.
As before, there are type vectors in which a patient depositor is first in the
queue and is asked to withdraw. However, she has a profitable deviation to
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wait, and by doing this, leads the game down an off-equilibrium path whose
outcome is no bank run since then, by sequential rationality, all patient
depositors are better off to wait. The proof is analogous to the one for the
pooling equilibrium candidate. Therefore, any strategy profile in this class
is no PBE either.
PBE
Up to now we have shown that any strategy profile that yields a bank run is
no PBE. We show next that the separating equilibrium candidate predicting
no bank run as outcome is a PBE. In order to do this, first the corresponding
strategy profile and a possible belief system are described. Then, it is shown
that no player’s deviation is profitable which establishes existence of PBE.
On the equilibrium path, any patient depositor waits and any impatient
one withdraws. In fact, an impatient depositor is asked to withdraw after
any history, though she is indifferent to wait or not once the bank ran out of
funds. On the same off-equilibrium paths, this indifference holds analogously
for patient depositors. Therefore, there are multiple PBE strategy profile
candidates that differ on off-equilibrium paths.
On the equilibrium path, every depositor’s strategy perfectly reveals her
type and it is consistent for a depositor to believe that those who wait are
patient and those who withdraw are impatient. Thus, she believes that the
remaining patient and impatient depositors are behind her in the queue. By
Bayesian updating, each distribution of remaining depositors is equally likely.
The first depositor who knows to be on an off-equilibrium path has to be
an impatient one who observes N−p withdrawals. While a patient depositor
who observes N−p withdrawals believes that all remaining depositors in the
queue are patient, an impatient one who observes this history knows to be
on an off-equilibrium path: given her type, this history has an ex ante 0-
probability and her belief updating is unconstrained. Hence, there are several
possible ways to update beliefs consistently and we propose one of them.
Suppose that she believes that all observed withdrawals are due to patient
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depositors. If there are more withdrawals than patient depositors, then she
believes that the remaining withdrawals were made by impatient depositors.
This is the stringest condition that fosters bank runs. In any case, she antic-
ipates that all depositors behind her are impatient. Finally, if there were less
withdrawals than patient depositors, then she believes that all withdrawals
are due to patient depositors, and that all impatient and the remaining pa-
tient depositors are behind her in the queue.
Consider the first patient depositor i in the queue after this transition
to the off-equilibrium path. She updates her belief in a Bayesian way. If i
believes that the number of withdrawals due to patient depositors is such
that c2,i < c1,i, even if i keeps the money in the bank, then i is prescribed
to withdraw. If on the other hand i believes that there are enough patient
depositors behind her such that c2,i > c1,i, provided that i and all those
depositors wait, then i is asked to wait.
In the last case, there could be another patient depositor j 6= i, at a later
position in the queue who observed enough additional withdrawals such that
c2,j < c1,j, provided that j believes that all withdrawals were due to patient
depositors. Then, there is a transition from the off-equilibrium path on which
c2,i > c1,i to the one on which c2,j < c1,j,
16 and j is prescribed to withdraw.
Belief updating in this transition from one off-equilibrium path to the
other is unconstrained since the observed history has an ex ante 0-probability,
and a patient depositor believes that enough if not all other patient depositors
were before her in the queue and withdrew, and thus, she anticipates that
all remaining depositors behind her in the queue will withdraw as well.
Finally, there is a third but less important type of off-equilibrium path:
if the bank ran out of funds, then any subsequent depositor in the queue is
indifferent to wait or not independently of her type and belief since her utility
16Lemma 1 describes all cases in which c2,j < c1,j since on any off-equilibrium path,
given the proposed belief system, the condition derived in the proof of Proposition 1 never
applies: that is, there cannot be y of funds left and a patient depositor believes that there
are only patient depositors behind her in the queue.
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is 0 whether she waits or withdraws. In this case, trivially there are several
belief systems that are consistent with the strategy profile of the remaining
depositors, and any strategy is sequentially rational given any of these beliefs.
No profitable deviation
We show next that no depositor has a profitable deviation from this strategy
profile. Obviously, no impatient depositor can deviate profitably.
Consider next any patient depositor and the different possible histories:
on the equilibrium path, no patient depositor i can deviate profitably by
withdrawing. Her belief to be on the equilibrium path is consistent with
the strategy profile and the available information. Given her belief, it is
sequentially rational for i to wait (since c∗2 > c
∗
1) and her expected utility
weighted by her belief is ui((θi − 1)c∗2) > ui(c∗1) given that θi = 2.
Consider now the different off-equilibrium paths. Suppose that c2,i > c1,i
for a patient depositor i, even if i believes that all withdrawals were due to
patient depositors. Then, given her belief, it is sequentially rational for i to
wait and this is consistent with her belief—i believes that there are enough
patient depositors behind her in the queue for c2,i > c1,i to hold, provided
that all of them wait. Her deviation to withdraw is not profitable.
On any other off-equilibrium path, a patient depositor i believes that
enough withdrawals were due to patient depositors such that c2,i < c1,i.
Hence, it is sequentially rational for i to withdraw and her belief is consistent
with her strategy. Her deviation to wait is not profitable since her expected
payoff weighted by her belief would yield her less if she waits. All subsequent
depositors observe a series of withdrawals, but not the depositors’ types, and
thus, each’s belief is consistent with her strategy and the observed history.
Finally, and as mentioned above, on an off-equilibrium path on which the
bank went bankrupt, no depositor’s deviation is profitable and any remaining
depositor’s utility is 0 independently of her strategy, type and belief.
Therefore, we found a strategy profile such that no depositor’s deviation
is ever profitable given any realization of the type vector and any history.
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This establishes existence and concludes the proof that no bank run is a
PBE outcome. Note again that there are other off-equilibrium path belief
systems and strategies. Any such strategy profile and belief system that is
sequentially rational and consistent, respectively, is also a PBE. Hence, there
is no unique PBE strategy profile and belief system.
A unique PBE outcome
After completely describing all possible strategy profiles that can be con-
structed given the set of depositors, their types and available strategy choices
(wait and withdraw), we proved that any other type of candidate is no PBE,
except for the separating equilibrium candidate in which on the equilibrium
path patient depositors wait and impatient ones withdraw, and therefore,
no bank run occurs. Since this is the only outcome arising from a PBE, it
follows that the unique equilibrium outcome is no bank run.
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